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There is a tension between John Locke’s awareness of the fundamental importance of a shared 
public language and the manner in which his theorizing appears limited to offering a psy-
chologistic account of the idiolects of individual speakers.  I argue that a correct understand-
ing of Locke’s central notion of signification can resolve this tension.  I start by examining a 
long standing objection to Locke’s view, according to which his theory of meaning systemati-
cally gets the subject matter of our discourse wrong, by making our ideas the meanings of our 
words.  By examining Locke’s definition of “truth”, I show that Lockean signification is an 
expression relation, rather than a descriptive or referential relation.  Consequently, the sense 
in which our words signify our ideas is roughly that our utterances advertise our otherwise 
undisclosed mental lives to each other.  While this resolves one aspect of the public/private 
tension, I close with a brief discussion of the remaining tension, and the role for norma-
tive constraints on signification to play in generating a genuinely shared public language.
Introduction
John Locke opens book three of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
by highlighting the social role of language. It is because we are social creatures, 
Locke tells us, that we require language. At the same time, the actual account 
of the workings of language that he offers is hyper-individualized and based 
in the psychologies of particular speakers. Locke explains the importance to 
humans of having a shared language, but, in essence, offers a theory on which 
each speaker has their own idiolect. So, there is a prima facie tension between 
Locke’s view of language’s fundamentally social purpose and his account of its 
fundamentally individualistic mechanisms. In this paper, I show how Locke 
resolves this tension between the social purpose of language and its individu-
alistic mechanisms.
One of the most common concerns about Locke’s theory, from his own day 
forward, was the objection that his individualistic, psychologistic account of 
the meaning of language winds up getting the subject matter of our discourse 
wrong. Locke has long been accused of incorrectly maintaining that when we 
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speak, we are always talking about our own ideas and mental states, rather 
than ever talking about objects and qualities in the external world. If correct, 
this objection is a major concern for Locke’s philosophy of language, as it is 
untenable to offer an account of language on which all of our assertions are 
making claims about the contents of our own minds. Fortunately for Locke, 
this objection turns on a misunderstanding of his views.
In the first section of this paper, I present this “wrong subject matter” objec-
tion, found in the writing of Locke’s contemporary John Sergeant, which was 
also offered later by John Stuart Mill, and which continues to be raised as an 
objection to Locke’s account. In section two, I show how a careful reading of 
Locke’s claims about truth show that the objection is misplaced. Locke’s theory 
of language does not render our own minds the constant and essential sub-
ject matter of our discourse. Instead, Locke’s theory presages an expressivist 
approach to thinking about language. In the third section of the paper, I turn 
to a remaining set of worries about how Locke’s individualistic psychological 
account of meaning leaves him with a theory of individual idiolects, and no 
theory of a common public language. While some thinkers could rest content 
without accounting for a shared language, Locke’s concern for the social nature 
of communication seem to require him to address this worry. In the conclusion 
of the paper, I articulate Locke’s normative approach to resolving the idiolect 
problem without positing a genuine public language.
Section 1: The Wrong Subject Matter Objection
John Locke is one of the few figures of the early modern period to offer an 
explicit, systematic treatment of the workings of language. The entirety of book 
three of the Essay concerns his account of language, and the very opening of 
his discussion helps to establish the outlook and orientation of his theorizing:
§1. god having designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only 
with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of 
his own kind; but furnished him also with Language, which was to be the 
great Instrument, and common Tye of Society. Man therefore had by Nature 
his Organs so fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate Sounds, which we call 
Words. But this was not enough yet to produce Language; for Parrots, and 
several other Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds distinct enough, 
which yet, by no means, are capable of Language.
§2. Besides articulate Sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should 
17Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke’s Theory of Language
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be able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions; and to make them 
stand as marks for the Ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be 
made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men’s Mind be conveyed from 
one to another. (Essay, 3.1.1–2)
In these two sections Locke establishes some of the most integral and core 
commitments of his account of language, including both the view that the 
purpose of language is to allow humans to enter into proper social relationships 
with one another, as well as the view that the mechanism by which language 
functions is the use of articulate sounds as outward manifestations of one’s 
thoughts.
According to Locke, the contents and events of one person’s mind are 
obscured from others. But humans are social creatures, and so, cannot flour-
ish in isolation from each other. The primary purpose of language, then, is to 
act as antidote to our natural state of social isolation, by permitting us to actu-
ally share the goings on of our inner lives with each other. Locke then proposes 
that the way language serves to do this is for an individual’s utterances to serve 
as signs of their thoughts, permitting them to create outward manifestations 
of their inner lives.
Stated this way, Locke’s basic picture has a lot of prima facie appeal. How-
ever, because of Locke’s focus on the social role of language in allowing us 
to share our mental lives with each other, his primary semantic relationship 
is one that obtains between words or utterances and an individual speaker’s 
thoughts and ideas. This feature has led to some fairly longstanding criticisms 
of Locke’s views.
To outline the basics of Locke’s view: a term like “Elizabeth” will signify your 
idea elizabeth.1 And a term like “human” will signify your idea human. In 
general, substantive terms will signify ideas. A word like “is” (or “is not”) on 
the other hand, will signify an act of the mind, like affirming (or denying).2 So 
the sentence “Elizabeth is human” signifies affirming human of elizabeth. A 
slightly less cumbersome way to phrase this would be to say that the sentence 
“Elizabeth is human” signifies the judgment/belief that Elizabeth is human.
In Locke’s own day, John Sergeant offered what I term the “wrong subject mat-
ter” objection against his idea-based theory of meaning, with a similar objec-
 1 I here adapt a convention, common to contemporary philosophy of mind, of designating 
ideas or concepts with all caps. 
 2 These positions are outlined straightforwardly in Essay 3.1 (for substantive terms) and 3.7.1 
(for the copula).
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tion offered later by Mill, and still offered casually today.3 Here is Sergeant’s 
presentation of the objection:
16. It may be perhaps replied, that the Ideas are only meant by the Words; 
because when we speak, we intend [Note: Proof 10th. Because when the thing 
it self is intended to be made known, the Thing it self is the first meaning, or 
what is first meant by the words. ] to signify our Thoughts. I answer, that, 
however it may be pretended that what is meant immediately by the words, 
is our Thoughts, when our own Thoughts or Judgments about any matter, are 
the things desir’d to be known; yet, when the Things are the Objects enquired 
after, as, when a Master teaches a Scholler Natural Philosophy, or any other 
Truth, the Intention of the Speakers does primarily aym and mean to signify 
the Things or Truths themselves; and not our Thoughts concerning them; and, 
therefore, the Things themselves are in the Intention and Mind, or are the 
Meanings of the Speakers, or Discoursers. And this passes generally in all 
other occasions, except only when the Knowledge of our Interiour Thoughts 
is ultimately aymed at. Thus, when a Gentleman bids his Servant fetch him 
a Pint of Wine; he does not mean to bid him fetch the Idea of Wine in his 
own head, but the Wine it self which is in the Cellar; and the same holds 
in all our Commerce and Conversation about things without us. (Sergeant 
1697, Preliminary Second [emphasis added])
Sergeant’s objection, despite it’s now-archaic presentation, is clear. When I 
say “get me the wine” I am asking for someone to retrieve actual wine, not to 
produce the idea of wine in my mind. Generally when I use the word “wine”, 
unless I am specifically trying to talk about my interior mental life, I am talking 
about wine itself, not my idea of wine. Here is a slightly more formal presenta-
tion of this objection:
Wrong Subject Matter (WSM) Objection:
 1. If “Elizabeth” signifies elizabeth, then the sentence “Elizabeth is 
human” is about elizabeth, not Elizabeth herself.
 2. The sentence “Elizabeth is human” is about Elizabeth herself, not eliz-
abeth.
 3. So, it is not the case that “Elizabeth” signifies elizabeth.
Let us grant premise (2), as it seems extremely plausible. So, the strength of 
this objection to Locke’s view hinges on the strength of premise (1). The WSM 
objection maintains that “Elizabeth” signifying the idea elizabeth means that 
utterances involving the term are thereby about the idea. And this point relies 
 3 Mill (2006), 1.2.1
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on the assumption that signification and aboutness will go hand in hand: if the 
things signified by a sentence are the things the sentence is about, it would be 
impossible for the Lockean view to escape this objection. So behind premise 
(1) is something like the principle that signification implies aboutness, and for 
individual words, that would be something like the principle that they refer 
to the things they signify. 
Locke doesn’t give us an explicit account of aboutness, making it harder to 
identify directly whether this is a principle Locke would subscribe to. How-
ever, there is still good reason to find this assumption questionable, and it has 
been questioned by a number of Locke scholars. Norman Kretzmann (1968) 
has argued that ideas on Locke’s theory of meaning function more like Fregean 
senses than referents (and thus, would not necessarily go hand in hand with 
“aboutness”). EJ Ashworth (1981), Paul Guyer (1994) and Walter Ott (2003) 
have also argued that that the sense of signification which Locke is using, 
inherited from ancient, medieval, or other early modern sources, does not 
track reference (and thus would not track aboutness). One notable exception 
is Michael Losonsky (2007), who grants that, for Locke, names refer to ideas, 
but attempts to defend the plausibility of such a view. 
My own interpretation differs in some important ways from those of 
Kretzmann, Ashworth, Guyer, and Ott but, importantly, aligns on this issue: 
that a term signifies something, for Locke, does not mean the term refers to 
that thing, or that utterances involving the term are automatically about the 
thing signified. 
So, the plan is to avoid the objection by denying premise (1). However, in 
order for this to be a successful reply to the objection, it is important to provide 
a sustainable account of how Locke avoids commitment to (1). And here, it is 
helpful to outline a positive account of Lockean signification.
Section 2: Locke’s Expressivist Account of Meaning And Assertion
In this section, I will show how Locke articulates what I term a sincerity-
conditional semantic theory. Many contemporary semantic theories we are 
familiar with are primarily in the business of providing truth conditions for 
sentences. The meaning assigned to a sentence on such accounts may be the 
truth conditions themselves, or a proposition which maps directly on to some 
truth conditions, or the like. If one is accustomed to such a perspective, it is 
natural to look at what Locke assigns as the meanings of sentences, and attri-
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bute to him a confusion about the subject matter of our discourse. Against that 
background perspective, if someone proposes that the meaning of the sentence 
“Elizabeth is human” is the belief that Elizabeth is human, rather than the state 
of affairs of Elizabeth being human, or a third-realm proposition that Eliza-
beth is human, or a function from worlds where Elizabeth is human to the 
value “true”, it is natural to think that Locke’s account of the meaning of the 
sentence will get the result that the sentence is true provided the speaker has 
that belief, rather than it being true provided that Elizabeth is a human being. 
But this way of interpreting his view deeply misunderstands the relationship 
Locke sees between language and mind.
For Locke, the role of language is to help us advertise our otherwise undis-
closed mental states to others. So when someone utters the sentence “Elizabeth 
is a human” the thing that Locke’s account treats as having primary impor-
tance is the relationship between the speaker and the psychological state they 
are attempting to put on display. The WSM objection effectively assumes that 
Locke’s account does so by making the sentence describe the speaker’s mental 
state. But, describing and displaying are different. Their difference is similar 
to the difference between:
 1: I am feeling pain.
 2: Ouch!
These two sentences are arguably related to the same mental state (a first per-
sonal pain sensation), but they differ in that the former straightforwardly 
describes oneself as having that mental state, while the other one seems to be 
an utterance we can make sense of because, typically, the person who (sincerely) 
says it is in that mental state. But they are not describing themselves as being 
in that mental state by saying “ouch”, they are merely allowing it to have an 
outward manifestation.4
So now, compare these two sentences, for Locke:
 3: I believe that Elizabeth is a human.
 4: Elizabeth is a human.
The defense of Locke here is that (3) and (4), like (1) and (2), can be related 
to the same mental state (a belief that Elizabeth is a human). But, whereas (3) 
describes that mental state, (4) displays, manifests, or expresses it. In other 
 4 This distinction is familiar in much contemporary literature on expressivism, See, for exam-
ple, Schroeder (2008).
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words, when someone utters (4), they have done so in order to advertise being 
in that mental state. They are not talking about that mental state, they are, 
instead, giving voice to that mental state.5
Locke’s fundamental semantic interest isn’t in the descriptive facet of lan-
guage, it is in language’s power to advertise or display what is going on in our 
head. Locke’s account of the meaning of a sentence doesn’t map a sentence to 
its truth conditions, rather it maps the sentence to the mental state that one 
is advertising through uttering that sentence, which I’ll term the sentence’s 
sincerity conditions.
If we think about the meanings of the sentences as their sincerity conditions, 
we can see why having the meaning of a given sentence be a judgment does 
not automatically involve getting the subject matter wrong. Instead, Locke is 
taking a stance on a different relationship than the one that Sergeant seems to 
be concerned with.6
Showing that the utterance isn’t about my own judgment is one thing, but it 
is a further step to show how Locke’s theory can secure the result that the utter-
ance is in fact about Elizabeth. As mentioned, Locke doesn’t offer an account 
of aboutness. He does, however, offer us a reasonably robust discussion of 
truth. And for the relevant issue here, that serves our purposes well. We can 
see whether Locke delivers on premise (2) by seeing what his account of truth 
would say about the truth conditions for a sentence like “Elizabeth is human”.
Here is Locke’s general definition of truth:
§2 Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify 
nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them, 
do agree or disagree one with another. The joining or separating of signs here 
meant is what by another name, we call Proposition. So that Truth properly 
belongs only to Propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. Mental and 
Verbal; as there are two sorts of Signs commonly made use of, viz. Ideas and 
Words. (Essay, 4.5.2)
Here we get a sort of correspondence account of truth. A joining (or separat-
 5 The difference between this approach and Ashworth’s “making known” is subtle, but signifi-
cant. Ashworth’s interpretation includes in the signification of a word/sentence a great deal 
more than just the idea/thought being displayed.
 6 It is worth noting that Sergeant’s objection dealt with an imperative sentence, and everything 
I am saying here is focused on declaratives. The point I am making can be generalized fairly 
easily. As an example, if imperative sentences are used to display desires (rather than beliefs) 
we can see how the reply to Sergeant would go: my utterance “(you) bring me the wine” 
signifies a desire of mine built out of my idea of the addressee, my idea of the wine, my idea 
of the act of bringing, and my idea of myself. That’s not to say the desire is about my ideas, 
but that it is built out of them.
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ing) of signs – a proposition – is true just in case the the things signified by the 
signs agree (or disagree) with one another. So, propositions join (or separate) 
signs, and the things signified by those signs stand in relations of agreement 
(and disagreement). If the signs are joined, and the things signified agree, the 
proposition is true. And, if the signs are separated, and the things signified dis-
agree, then the proposition is true. Otherwise, the proposition will not be true. 
Importantly, Locke distinguishes between two types of propositions here, men-
tal and verbal. As Locke clarifies in 4.5.5, mental propositions are composed of 
ideas, and (many) ideas signify objects in the world, while verbal propositions, 
on the other hand, are composed of words and words signify ideas. So far all 
that has been said, there is still room for the Sergeant/Mill worry: my relevant 
beliefs may be directly about the world, but my utterances might not turn out 
to be about the world (they may even still turn out to be about my beliefs). 
However, looking to Locke’s further elaboration on these two types of truth, 
we can see that this is not the case:
§6 [ … ] When Ideas are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they, or 
the Things they stand for do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, mental Truth. 
But Truth of Words is something more, and that is the affirming or denying of 
Words one of another, as the Ideas they stand for agree or disagree: And this 
again is twofold. Either purely Verbal, and trifling, which I shall speak of, or 
Real and instructive; which is the Object of that real Knowledge, which we 
have spoken of already. (Essay, 4.5.6)
Locke’s treatment of mental truth here is very brief. A judgment is mentally 
true just in case the ideas joined (separated) in it, or the things they stand for, 
agree (disagree).7 As to the truth of words, Locke tells us that it is “the affirming 
or denying of Words one of another as the Ideas they stand for agree or dis-
agree”. Here we see that the account for an utterance like “Elizabeth is human” 
will affirm “human” of “Elizabeth” which will then be true provided that our 
idea human agrees with our idea elizabeth.
What is crucial to appreciate here about Locke’s account is that there are 
two relevant pairs of concepts being deployed: joining/separating, and agree-
ment/disagreement. For Locke, a verbal proposition is true when the verbal 
signs are joined (separated) in parallel with the agreement (disagreement) of 
the ideas signified, not when words are joined (separated) in parallel with the 
joining (separating) of the ideas signified. So, as I argued above, an utterance 
of “Elizabeth is human” isn’t made true by the speaker having the belief that 
 7 The disjunction here is to cover the case of ideas without archetypes (Pegasus, Centaurs, etc.). 
In such cases, the agreements will terminate with the ideas themselves, rather than depending 
on some further agreement between the objects, since there are no objects.
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Elizabeth is human. Instead, it is made true by some concordance between 
the speaker’s idea elizabeth and their idea human.8 In fact, a few section 
later (4.5.11), Locke defines a concept of “moral truth” (not in the sense of the 
truths of morality, but rather a morally relevant definition of truth) as “speak-
ing Things according to the perswasion of our own Minds, though the Propo-
sition we speak agree not to the reality of Things”. This is a definition of what 
we’d more likely call honesty, and Locke specifically distinguishes it from his 
account of “the truth of words”. One way to put my proposal is that the core 
of Locke’s account of language tells you what it takes to utter a sentence hon-
estly, rather than what it takes for an utterance of it to be true. The truth con-
ditions will be a secondary feature, derived from this primary assignment of 
sincerity conditions.9
To summarize: “Elizabeth is human” is a verbal proposition, composed 
of “Elizabeth” signifying the idea elizabeth, “human” signifying the idea 
human, and “is” signifying the act of affirmation or the joining of those two 
ideas. The whole thing signifies a judgment joining human and elizabeth. 
But for “Elizabeth is human” to be true, requires that human and elizabeth 
agree with each other, not that they have been joined by the speaker. And for 
human and elizabeth to agree with each other requires that the things they 
stand for agree with each other (namely Elizabeth and the astra idea human). 
Setting aside whether Locke winds up having the right truth conditions for the 
belief that Elizabeth is human, the general structure of his account of verbal 
truth seems correct, here: the truth conditions for the sentence “Elizabeth is 
human” and the judgement that Elizabeth is human wind up being the same, 
systematically. And this seems right. The truth conditions of your utterances 
should match the beliefs you are displaying by making such utterances.10 And 
this, it is clear, his account captures.
However, there is one remaining related concern, which will be the focus of 
the next section. So far, we’ve been ignoring the fact that my idea elizabeth 
and your idea elizabeth might be different in their particulars. Locke talks 
explicitly about people having different qualities built in to their idea of gold 
 8 My treatment of Lockean judgments here is cursory and oversimplified in some ways. For 
a better, more thorough treatment of Locke’s account of judgment, see Smalligan-Marusic 
(2014).
 9 By advertising your belief that Elizabeth is human, you have publicly put yourself on the 
hook for possessing that belief, and can be held to account or challenged by someone with 
a contradictory belief. On this account, assertion is the result of publicizing one’s beliefs.
 10 Other approaches can obviously capture this systematic alignment in the other direc-
tion: because the sentence has certain truth-conditions, believing what you say means 
that you would only utter it if you possessed the belief that has those truth conditions.
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or of swans, and the same thing will go for ideas of individual people, or really, 
any of our ideas. At first glance, this means we would all be speaking subtly 
different languages, and talking past each other constantly. If it is part of my 
idea of Elizabeth that she was 30 feet tall, then my utterance of “Elizabeth is 
30 feet tall” would turn out to be true, rather than false. And that seems like 
the wrong result.
Section 3: The Problem of Idiolects
Locke’s theory, as it has been so far laid out, looks like it fundamentally offers 
an account of individual idiolects.11 In fact, Locke even implicitly recognizes 
this when describing our ideas of swans as an example of complex ideas of 
substances (emphasis added):
Thus the Idea which an English-man signifies by the Name Swan is white 
Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs, and whole Feet, and all these of a 
certain size, with a power of swimming in the Water, and making a certain 
kind of Noise, and, perhaps, to a Man, who has long observed those kind 
of Birds, some other Properties, which all terminate in sensible simple Ideas, 
all united in one common subject. (Essay, 2.24.14)
We can use this case to lay out the concern for Locke’s view. Consider four 
individuals, First, Locke’s standard Englishman (the layperson), and his swan 
observer (the expert). Let’s also consider someone with an underdeveloped 
views of swans (the novice) and someone with mistaken views of swans (the 
bungler). So, the idea that the first signifies by the term “swan” is composed of 
the qualities enumerated by Locke in the passage above. The idea that the sec-
ond signifies by the term is composed of all of those, plus some extra qualities 
common to swans (e.g. that they are largely herbivorous). The idea the third 
signifies by the term is composed of a partial subset of the qualities Locke enu-
merated (omitting the redness of the beak). And the idea the the fourth signifies 
by the term includes all those enumerated by Locke, and also some qualities 
not actually possessed by swans (e.g. that they can breathe underwater).
Let’s examine what the view of truth outlined in the last section seems to 
commit Locke to for utterances of some swan related sentences by these four:
 S1. Swans are white.
 11 A somewhat similar worry to the one developed here is presented in Stainton (1996), p. 101.
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 S2. Swans have red beaks.
 S3. Swans are mostly herbivorous.
 S4. Swans are able to breathe underwater.
It seems that regardless of which of the four utters (S1), it will turn out true. 
All of them signify an idea by “swan” that agrees with the idea WHITE. The 
layperson, the expert, and even the bungler would also clearly speak truly 
when they utter (S2), though we don’t yet know what Locke would say about 
the novice’s utterance here, because while the sort of agreement between ideas 
that is involved when the one idea is partially composing the other is clearly 
sufficient, we haven’t established what else could be sufficient for the ideas to 
agree. Similarly, the expert’s uttering (S3) is clearly true on the account we 
have so far, but it is as yet unclear how to assess whether anyone else speaks 
truly in uttering it. And lastly, it seems like Locke is committed to saying the 
bungler speaks truly when uttering (S4), and though we need to know more 
to decisively assess this, it is unlikely that any of the other three would speak 
truly by uttering (S4).
However, even merely allowing that the bungler can utter (S4) truly is suf-
ficient to raise this worry. Locke’s view is obviously going to be a non-starter if 
the swan expert speaks truly in saying “Swans are able to breathe underwater”. 
But that would mean that when the bungler utters that sentence, and the expert 
says “Swans are not able to breathe underwater”, the two are talking past each 
other, because they are effectively speaking different languages. The bungler is 
saying a true thing about a fictional type of bird, while the expert is denying a 
false claim about an actual species.
An ideal treatment would have room for error in addition to ignorance. We 
want a view on which all four people are speaking the same language, and so, 
a view on which the truth-value of the four sentences above doesn’t depend 
on which of the four is speaking. And there is a special challenge for Locke in 
offering such a view, because of Locke’s specific focus on language’s role for 
displaying the contents of our minds to others. So, prima facie, the utterances 
of the bungler should be signifying the idea he possesses.
Interestingly, Locke has the resources to develop a view on which he could 
offer a reply that maintains that the bungler both signifies his bungled idea 
and that he utters something false when he speaks, though it is not clear that 
he ultimately offers such a reply. Towards the end of the second book of the 
Essay Locke outlines several pairs of contrasting attributes which can be (in 
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some sense) applied to ideas.12 Significant for our purposes is the contrast he 
draws between real and fantastical ideas, and the discussion of true and false 
ideas.
With respect to the first, the bungler’s idea is fantastical, rather than real, 
because there is no external archetype for his idea of a long-necked, red-beaked 
( … ) white bird that breathes water. Locke would say that, at best, the Bungler 
is believing (and thus) saying something on a par with claims about centaurs 
and gorgons. But this is not good enough for our purposes, as it does nothing 
to render anything about the claim false. 
At the same time, it is helpful in explaining how Locke can get the intuitively 
correct results for the novice’s utterance of (S2) and both the novice and layper-
son’s utterances of (S3). Because the other three all do have ideas with an exter-
nal archetype, Locke can appeal to the actual co-existence of red-beakedness 
and herbivorousness with the other qualities that are in their ideas of swans 
to explain why their swan ideas in fact agree with the ideas of herbivorousness 
and red-beakedness.13 
However, this real/fantastical distinction will only help with ideas of sub-
stances (swans, humans). If the dispute concerns ideas of modes, which don’t 
require external archetypes, there would be no distinction to be drawn, as the 
direction of fit is reversed. So, Locke’s distinction between true and false ideas 
is much more helpful for a general response to the worry:
§1 though Truth and Falshood belong, in Propriety of Speech, only to Propo-
sitions; yet Ideas are oftentimes termed true or false (as what Words are there, 
that are not used with great Latitude, and with some deviation from their 
strict and proper Significations?) Though, I think, that when Ideas themselves 
are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit Proposition, which is 
the Foundation of that Denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the par-
ticular Occasions, wherein they come to be called true or false. (Essay, 2.32.1)
Ideas are never, strictly speaking, true or false. But we do sometimes label them 
true or false, and Locke here claims that this is done only when there is an 
accompanying proposition or judgment which is itself genuinely false. Locke 
goes on to outline the two primary ways in which ideas are rendered false in 
this derivative sense:
§4 When-ever the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any thing extraneous to 
 12 These pairings are: clarity/obscurity, distinctness/confusion, real/fantastical, adequate/inad-
equate, and true/false.
 13 It is unsurprising that agreement between ideas is not a purely internal relation between 
them, since Locke does not think that all truths are a priori.
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them, they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the Mind in such 
a reference, makes a tacit Supposition of their Conformity to that Thing: 
which Supposition, as it happens to be true or false; so the Ideas themselves 
come to be denominated. The most usual Cases wherein this happens, are 
these following: 
§5 First, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has, conformable to that in other 
Men’s Minds called by the same common Name; v.g. when the Mind intends, or 
judges its Ideas of Justice, Temperance, Religion, to be the same, with what other 
Men give those Names to. Secondly, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has 
in it self, to be conformable to some real Existence. Thus the two Ideas, of a Man, 
and a Centaur, supposed to be the Ideas of real Substances, are the one true, and 
the other false; the one having a Conformity to what has really existed; the other 
not. Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real Constitution, and 
Essence of any thing, whereon all its Properties depend: and thus the greatest 
part, if not all our Ideas of Substances, are false. (Essay, 2.32.4–5)
Here, Locke tells us that the main judgments that accompany ideas permitting 
them to become (derivatively) true or false are (a) when one assumes that the 
idea they signify by a name is conformable to the idea that other people signify 
by that name, (b) when one assumes that the idea in question is conformable 
to some really really existing thing, and (c) when one assumes that the idea 
captures the things real essence. This last one is largely irrelevant for our pur-
poses here, but the first two both seem applicable to the case of the bungler: the 
bungler is tacitly assuming that their idea swan corresponds to other people’s 
idea swan, and that their idea swan corresponds to certain actual long-necked 
white birds out in the world. 
Locke’s take on the bungler’s utterance then is that the bungler signifies their 
judgment that breathe underwater agrees with their idea swan, and that that 
judgment is, in isolation, true, but their idea swan is doubly false, neither cor-
responding to other people’s use of “swan” nor to reality. Locke doesn’t tell us 
that these tacit judgments are in fact conveyed, signified or displayed by the 
bungler’s utterance of the sentence. That view would roughly amount to the 
idea that most utterances express a conjunction of beliefs, including a belief 
that the words you just used signify corresponding ideas to the ones other 
people used as well as a belief that your ideas correspond to things out in the 
world. And so the utterance by the bungler would be overall false because it 
amounts to a conjunction of one true (irrelevant, fantastical belief ) and two 
false beliefs about their idea swan. Instead, Locke seems to take the stand that 
the bungler’s utterance was true in his idiolect, but that there are some impor-
tant/relevant false beliefs involved in the bungler’s overall situation.
So, as it has been presented here, Locke’s view accepts the counterintuitive 
consequence that the bungler has said something true in this case, but attempts 
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to mitigate that consequence by pointing out the related falsities in the beliefs 
of the speaker. But if the bungler simply didn’t have views about what other 
people’s ideas of swans were like (or vandalism, if we want to use an example 
of a mode), they’d escape the falsity Locke is able to identify here. But if we 
are each speaking our own individual languages, how can Locke offer any criti-
cism of a speaker like Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty,14 who intentionally 
uses words in a manner indifferent to their commonly accepted meanings?
Conclusion: A Lockean Public Language?
William Lycan (2008) provides a nice statement of just this concern as an objec-
tion to ideational theories of meaning:
Meaning is a public, intersubjective, social phenomenon. An English word 
has the meaning it does for the entire community of English speakers, even 
if some members of that community happen not to understand that word. 
Butideas, images, and feelings in the mind are not intersubjective in that way; 
they are subjective, held only in the minds of individual persons, and they 
differ from person to person depending on one’s total mental state and back-
ground.Therefore, meanings are not ideas in the mind. (Lycan 2008, 
p. 68)
Here, I think the best way to understand Locke’s avenue for reply involves 
recognizing that the social purpose of language produces normative force for 
speakers.15 Simply put: if the primary goal of speaking is to disclose the con-
tents of your mind to others, you have good reason to try to coordinate the 
signification of your terms with them. As Locke puts it in his discussion of the 
abuses of language: 
§29 [ … ] He that applies the Words of any Language to Ideas, different from 
those, to which the common use of that Country applies them, however 
his own Understanding may be fill’d with Truth and Light, will not by such 
Words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his Terms. 
For however, the Sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter 
the Ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other Ideas 
than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the Mind 
of the Hearers, they cannot make known the Thoughts of him who thus uses 
them. (Essay, 3.10.29)
 14 Caroll, 1872.
 15 Ott (2004) notes that there is normativity here, but does not elaborate on its role in coor-
dinating our usage.
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I think this fairly plausible point from Locke is why he is not concerned with 
generating a full account of a public language of the sort Lycan is describes. 
Having a public language would allow Locke to say that Humpty Dumpty is 
speaking falsely, but Locke’s view is rather that Humpty Dumpty’s use of lan-
guage is impractical. Locke doesn’t need his utterances to be false; the impor-
tant complaint is that Humpty Dumpty’s meaning is opaque to his audience. 
And if the point of his uttering something is to give us a glimpse of what’s 
going on in his head, then he’s not going to succeed – unless he explains what 
he means by the words (or, more effectively) conforms his signification to that 
of other speakers. So, for Locke, speakers are normatively encouraged to seek 
as much overlap as possible in the constellation of their individual idiolects.16 
One could even say that when there is a certain critical mass of overlap, that 
becomes the meaning of the term in some public language, but the background 
normative system will do the actual work of explaining what Humpty Dumpty 
and the bungler are doing wrong.17 So, for Locke, the individualist mechan-
ics of language are prerequisites for achieving its social purpose, but they can 
function in isolation. The social purpose further provides norms on how to 
communicate effectively, and those norms are what do the work of encourag-
ing us to speak language the same way.
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